tls

Re: [TLS] TLS Digest, Vol 223, Issue 7Re: [TLS] TLS Digest, Vol 223, Issue 7

Duke Abbaddon

2023-02-09

Re: [TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?Re: [TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

Achim Kraus

2023-02-06

[TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?[TLS] I know TLS Device & Radio & BT protocol, For such things as mice & keyboards & Game-Pads, Could propose AES & PSK, Can you see ECDHE Being used ? maybe Preshare & seeded PSK is better, Can we make a protocol TLS for devices ?

Duke Abbaddon

2023-02-06

Re: [TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RSRe: [TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS

Christopher Wood

2023-01-29

[TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS[TLS] Fwd: These pdf research documents on elliptic curves are a harder read, i am conversant with classic algebra, can you work them out into Open Source Code for Miracl security C++ & other windows and linux libraries, converting these World class Elliptic curves would earn a lot of linux, windows & IETF.org and NIST Credit, faithfully yours RS

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-29

[TLS] TLS Research documentation; for the proposal & ratification of Post Quantum & ECDHE Protocols with elliptic curves & EEC S-Box - RS 2023-01[TLS] TLS Research documentation; for the proposal & ratification of Post Quantum & ECDHE Protocols with elliptic curves & EEC S-Box - RS 2023-01

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-29

[TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS[TLS] Light-weight TLS & Elliptic security for assessments & update of PQC & TLS with my own work also but also further reading i have done : RS

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-26

[TLS] So our answer is complexity; Multiple simple solves; one ontop of another aka (exchange EEC+) EEC AES Polycha[TLS] So our answer is complexity; Multiple simple solves; one ontop of another aka (exchange EEC+) EEC AES Polycha

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-26

[TLS] tls key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter (c)Rupert S[TLS] tls key sharing agreement : RS I have regarded the tls key sharing agreement & it occurs to me that all modes may be improved with combination of a Nonce-PSK-Type-Key, For example held by the verifying certificate agency such as lets encrypt & SafeSSL & Cloudflare, Submitting a lightly cyphered PSK Key would take milliseconds & consume only 10000th of a second on GB/S Ethernet & therefor be unnoticeable and thus secure for the initiation encounter (c)Rupert S

Duke Abbaddon

2023-01-25

Re: [TLS] [Gen-art] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04Re: [TLS] [Gen-art] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04

Dan Romascanu

2017-05-25

Re: [TLS] [Gen-art] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04Re: [TLS] [Gen-art] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04

Daniel Migault

2017-05-24

Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]

Jeffrey Walton

2015-06-01

Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]

Aaron Zauner

2015-06-01

Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]Re: [TLS] AES-OCB in TLS [New Version Notification for draft-zauner-tls-aes-ocb-03.txt]

Aaron Zauner

2015-06-01

Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?

Salz, Rich

2014-11-07

Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?

Fox Arcadia

2014-11-06

Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?Re: [TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard

2014-10-19

[TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?[TLS] RFC5487 PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384. Premaster secret if ciphersuites negotiated for TLS V1.2?

Fox Arcadia

2014-09-20

Re: [TLS] TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 security parametersRe: [TLS] TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 security parameters

Robert Cragie

2012-03-05

Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFCRe: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFC

Sean Turner

2011-03-08

Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFCRe: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFC

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos

2011-02-28

Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFCRe: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFC

Satoru Kanno

2011-02-28

[TLS] Call for Review on draft-kanno-tls-camellia-psk-00[TLS] Call for Review on draft-kanno-tls-camellia-psk-00

Satoru Kanno

2010-01-28

[TLS] RFC 5487 on Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode[TLS] RFC 5487 on Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode

rfc-editor

2009-03-10

[TLS] Protocol Action: 'Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Proposed Standard[TLS] Protocol Action: 'Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode' to Proposed Standard

The IESG

2009-02-02

[TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm (Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode) to Proposed Standard[TLS] Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm (Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode) to Proposed Standard

The IESG

2009-01-12

[TLS] Proto write-up for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-05[TLS] Proto write-up for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-05

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)

2008-11-05

[TLS] Proto write-up for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05[TLS] Proto write-up for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)

2008-10-31

[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05.txt[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05.txt

Internet-Drafts

2008-10-30

[TLS] TLS Working Group Status[TLS] TLS Working Group Status

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)

2008-10-30

[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-04.txt[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-04.txt

Internet-Drafts

2008-10-30

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txtRe: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Pasi.Eronen

2008-10-23

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txtRe: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)

2008-10-22

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txtRe: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Alfred Hönes

2008-10-20

Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txtRe: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Pasi.Eronen

2008-10-20

[TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt[TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)

2008-10-06

Re: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new -mac-aes-gcmRe: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new -mac-aes-gcm

Mark Tillinghast

2008-09-26

Re: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new -mac-aes-gcmRe: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new -mac-aes-gcm

badra

2008-09-26

Re: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcmRe: [TLS] New version of draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm

badra

2008-09-26

[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt[TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-03.txt

Internet-Drafts

2008-09-25

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